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In this Article, Professors Chang and Culp propose that the Supreme
Court's decision in Romer v. Evans, viewed by some scholars as a progres-
sive case about gay/lesbian/bisexual rights, has little to do with
gay/lesbian/bisexual rights as such. They argue that whatever protection
Romer provides to gays, lesbians, and bisexuals is provided not because of
*their sexuality but, rather, despite it. The authors demonstrate their thesis by
examining the racial underpinnings of the Court's opinion, which begins
with Justice Harlan's famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson and which relies
on a specific vision of color-blindness. This submerged racial jurisprudence
provides the basic architecture for the Court's sexuality-blind
constitutionalism. The authors are critical of color-blindness and sexuality-
blindness because they preclude the Court and this nation from dealing
honestly with race and sex and leave intact deeply embedded racial and
sexual structures of oppression.
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[Harlan's] words [of dissent in Plessy] now are understood
to state a commitment to the law's neutrality where the
rights of persons are at stake.'
[L]aws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable
inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity
toward the class of persons affected .... Amendment 2 clas-
sifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but
to make them unequal to everyone else.2
I. INTRODUCTION
A question raised by the Supreme Court's opinion in Romer v. Evans is
what do gay/lesbian/bisexual rights3 have to do with equal protection for
' Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1623 (1996) (discussing Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
2 Id. at 1628-29.
3 We bracket "gay/lesbian/bisexual" to emphasize the odd constitutional logic at
work in Romer. Although Romer is in some ways the most progressive case involving
civil rights for gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, the Court decided to protect the rights of
these groups not because of their status as sexual minorities but, rather, despite it. The
Court afforded them protection as persons who happen to be gay/lesbian/bisexual.
"Gay/lesbian/bisexual-ness," although central to the case, was peripheral to the Court's
constitutional logic. See infra text accompanying notes 98-100. Although the locution
"gay/lesbian/bisexual" is an odd one, we use it instead of the word "queer" because of
the language in Colorado's Amendment 2 and in Romer. On the use of "queer," see
Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation
of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83
CAL. L. REV. 1, 346-50 (1995). For excellent discussions of the politics of queer identi-
ty, see Lauren Berlant & Elizabeth Freeman, Queer Nationality, in FEAR OF A QUEER
PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY 193 (Michael Warner ed., 1993), and
Steven Seidman, Identity and Politics in a "Postmodern" Gay Culture: Some Historical
and Conceptual Notes, in FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND SOCIAL
THEORY, supra, at 105.
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racial minorities? Our answer is nothing and everything.
Romer is written by Justice Kennedy as if the rights of sexual minorities
and the rights of racial minorities are distantly related cousins. Although
both sets of rights implicate the Equal Protection Clause, they are only
loosely connected because different levels of scrutiny apply.4 For gays, les-
bians, and bisexuals, rational basis is used, a test that generally has guar-
anteed the constitutionality of whatever is being scrutinized; for racial mi-
norities, the strict scrutiny standard is used, which generally has guaranteed
the unconstitutionality of whatever is being scrutinized.5 Historically, this
has meant that gays, lesbians, and bisexuals received very little constitution-
al protection, whereas racial minorities were "special favorites" of the law
and were afforded "greater" constitutional protection against laws that tar-
geted them for different treatment. 6 However, recent equal protection deci-
sions reflect an inversion: the identity group most successful in making
equal protection challenges based on strict scrutiny has been whites, perhaps
earning them a designation as the new "special favorites" of the law.7 And
curiously, gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, notwithstanding Bowers v.
Hardwick,8 have managed under the rational basis test to challenge success-
fully Colorado's Amendment 2.' In this sense, Romer is a very interesting
" Although the Romer majority is not explicit, Justice Scalia is correct in his dissent
when he said, "The Court evidently agrees that 'rational basis'-the normal test for
compliance with the Equal Protection Clause-is the governing standard." Romer, 116
S. Ct. at 1632 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For racial minorities and strict scrutiny, see
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("It should be noted, to begin
with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect .... It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny.").
' It is ironic that the decision establishing the application of the strict scrutiny stan-
dard when a racial group is targeted is one of the only decisions in which the particular
governmental action passed constitutional muster. See generally Korematsu, 323 U.S.
214 (upholding the exclusions of persons of Japanese ancestry on the basis of military
necessity).
.6 We have our doubts that racial minorities have ever really been "special favorites"
of the law, notwithstanding Justice Bradley's pronouncement in the Civil Rights Cases.
See infra text accompanying note 57 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24-
25 (1883)).
' Laws benefitting racial minorities are seen as harming whites according to the
zero-sum logic of the Court's contemporary race jurisprudence.
8 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
9 The Amendment reads:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation.
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any
of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall en-
act, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homo-
sexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall
constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to
19971
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application of the rational basis jurisprudence of the Court. According to
some commentators, it may be an important new precedent protecting the
right of groups to participate equally in the political process."0 But none of
these issues influence how we look at racial concerns because race is con-
trolled by strict scrutiny. As such, it is not surprising that Justice Kennedy's
discussion of equal protection on the basis of sexuality had little to say
overtly about equal protection on the basis of race. In this sense, Romer has
nothing to say about race. 1
have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of
discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-exe-
cuting.
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b. The Amendment passed by a margin of 53.4% to 46.6%,
or 813,966 to 710,151. It was ruled unconstitutional in Romer.
10 See Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 WM. & MARY
BILL RTs. J. 89 (1997). Professor Koppelman notes that the most eminent constitutional
authorities do not agree on what Romer means:
Some think that the Court was sub silentio following the Colorado Supreme
Court's theory that the Amendment impaired gays' "right to participate equally in
the political process." Ronald Dworkin and Robert Bork, who rarely agree, both
think that Romer holds that the law may not draw moral distinctions based on the
sexual practices of consenting adults. Cass Sunstein similarly thinks "[t]he under-
lying judgment in Romer must be that, at least for purposes of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, it is no longer legitimate to discriminate against homosexuals as a
class simply because the state wants to discourage homosexuality or homosexual
behavior."... [Akhil Amar and Lawrence Tribe] think that the law's problem is
that it singles out a named class to suffer a disadvantage.
Id. at 90-91 (citations omitted).
" Constitutional scholars also have ignored the race issue at the heart of Romer.
These scholars have been almost universal in their criticism of the reasoning in Justice
Kennedy's opinion in Romer. They have questioned whether all the important questions
posed by Romer were answered by the Court. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, The Missing
Pages of the Majority Opinion in Romer v. Evans, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 387 (1997).
The missing pages of this opinion for Professor Baker involved reconciling Bowers with
the Court's decision in Romer.
Professor Alexander argues that the Court fails to say whether Amendment 2 vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause because the Amendment singles out gay, lesbian, and
bisexual people, not people who engage in same-sex sexual conduct, or because the
Court restricted the Amendment to only the conduct of gays, lesbians, or bisexuals. See
Larry Alexander, Sometimes Better Boring and Correct: Romer v. Evans as an Exercise
of Ordinary Equal Protection Analysis, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 335 (1997). Put different-
ly, the Court fails to say whether the problem is that the category impacted by Amend-
ment 2 is.wrong for identity or "conduct" reasons. One problem with this formulation is
that it loses its way in distinctions between equal protection and due process. When
Alexander says, "The problem is that the state owes some explanation for why it has
affirmatively exempted only those who engage in homosexual conduct from possible
protection and not, for example, convicted (or suspected) murders, rapists, or thieves,"
he raises the question as to what is suspect about gay identity. Id. at 341. Most of us
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would find it racist for someone to argue that because someone is black they are "sus-
pected" of being murders, rapists, or thieves (or drug users, sexually unquenchable, or
superior athletes), but it is perfectly appropriate in this debate to suggest that having a
gay identity makes one suspected of particular same-sex acts. People understand the
identity question is problematic. The point we would like to make is that the conduct
issue is also problematic. Think for example of the opening scenes from the movie Kiss
Me Guido. In one scene, two apparently gay men are kissing on the street causing an
Italian American character to yell disapproving comments out the window of the auto-
mobile. This is immediately followed by this same character kissing his male Italian
American relative on the lips. The law does not make kissing illegal--perhaps cannot
make kissing between consenting adults illegal--because to do so would outlaw non-
sexual and sexual forms of kissing. The effort to say that gay/lesbian/bisexual stands for
conduct eludes this dilemma by not specifying the conduct that is at issue and by hiding
behind assumptions that are socially known but never specified.
Janet Halley understands this point and finds that Justice Kennedy's Romer opinion
is not as confused or incomplete as others suggest. See Janet E. Halley, Romer v.
Hardwick, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 429 (1987). She notes that there are two separate gaps
that concern constitutional scholars. She calls the first the "Padula Gap" after an appel-
late court decision of a District of Columbia panel that included then Judge Bork. The
court said that if Bowers says it is all right to criminalize homosexual conduct, it must
include the right to do lesser things to them. See id. at 430. The lesser oppression is
included in the ability of the government to do the greater. The second gap is the
"Tribe Brief Gap." This gap is caused by the Court's seeming acceptance in Romer of
part of the argument deftly made in a brief authored by Professor Tribe and others. The
essence of Tribe's argument was that the Court did not have to reach the interesting and
complicated issues of suspectness, rationality, or fundamental rights (whether invasion
of gay/lesbian/and bisexual rights is a violation of some fundamental right) because
Amendment 2 violates some prior and more basic question. See id. at 432. The Court
seems to accept this argument that Amendment 2 violates .some prior basic right while
at the same time basing its opinion on rationality. See id. at 430. Professor Halley ar-
gues persuasively that these gaps ultimately leave out gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. Pro-
fessor Halley contends that Justice Kennedy focuses on the status of gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals as the place for analysis and discrimination. See id. at 439-40. This focus on
status is at the heart of the Court's ability to leave out gays and lesbians while protect-
ing them. Halley argues that Farber and Sherry and Amar are wrong in reading a gap in
unexplained constitutional doctrine and the need for a fundamental right because they
focus on the identity/conduct distinction that the Court rejects. See id. at 441 (discussing
Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 257
(1996), and Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95
MICH. L. REV. 203 (1996)). Professor Halley concludes by arguing:
Justice Kennedy sets out analytic tools [by shifting the focus of analysis from in-
trinsic nature to status] that could be used to dismantle the speech act dynamics of
Hardwick. Indeed, the same tools can and should be used to critique Justice
Scalia's construal of Amendment 2: if the people of Colorado are guilty of elimi-
nating for others protections that they "take[] for granted ... because they already
have them or do not need them," then so are the dissenters. But the majority
wields these tools only against Amendment 2: Hardwick's textual structure re-
mains intact, and the Romer dissenters are treated as the rational, objective, sex-
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However, the simple truth is that Romer is always and everywhere a
case about race as well as being about the rights of gays, lesbians, and bi-
sexuals. Justice Kennedy begins his opinion with a cryptic reference to Jus-
tice Harlan's dissent in Plessy, but he quotes from the second most impor-
tant race case in the first century of constitutional jurisprudence without
making any reference to race.12 The Plessy dissent, as understood by the
majority in Romer, is about equal protection as neutrality of law and is not
about race except to say that race should be, irrelevant. 3 In this sense, race
less speakers enacted by the majority.
Id. at 451-52.
What Professor Halley does not note is that this same standard is not applied in
race cases either. From Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), to Wygant v. Jack-
son Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986), the Court is unwilling to see that its
rhetorical tools take for granted a number of racial privileges that come with being
white in America. In Washington v. Davis, the Court ignored the implication of privi-
lege, created by a host of societal factors, that leaves blacks with less educational re-
sources and less likelihood of passing a nonvalidated examination. Because the Court
concluded the plaintiffs could not prove that there was intentional discrimination on the
part of the largely black district government, and because the Court assumes that the
government is disconnected from the results of the public educational system, there is
no discrimination in the exclusion of a disproportionate number of black applicants
from eligibility for employment with the District of Columbia police department. In
Wygant, the Court ignored the economic circumstances of black teachers. In order to
recruit black teachers to the Jackson School District, the School Board and the teachers'
union had negotiated a contract that provided that black teachers could not be laid off if
doing so would reduce the overall percentage of black teachers in the district. See
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 270-71. Black teachers shared in the overall layoffs, but this con-
tract prohibited their bearing a disproportionate share of those layoffs. The Court could
not see that this claim was not asking for special privileges in an economically neutral
and fair market, but instead was trying to respond to the economic circumstances that
exist in the market based upon race. The Court should know that black teachers are
more likely to be laid off and less likely to be able to find a job than are white teach-
ers. Race matters in the job market, but because the Court concluded that discrimination
was not caused directly by the government, it cannot be remedied through governmental
race-conscious efforts. The Court's plurality opinion in Wygant assumes that blacks
have had access to seniority in the same ways as whites and therefore that giving rights
to black school teachers to deal with the societal backdrop created by our racial present
is seen as granting something "special" to them.
Maybe the Court adopts this sexless and basically lifeless interpretation of sexual
orientation in Romer precisely because it cannot see its racial existence either. Professor
Halley dismantles the sexual rhetoric of Justice Scalia, but she does not see (or at least
does not note) that this rhetoric is part and parcel of the rhetoric that creates the Court's
current racial jurisprudence. Specialness in the American legal and constitutional con-
text seems to always be partially about race.
12 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623. Kennedy is consistent throughout. Although he
cites to some "race" cases, there is never any explicit discussion of race. If race ap-
pears, it is in the parentheticals, closeted, as it were.
13 This echoes the way that sexual minority status is peripheral in Romer. In the
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becomes peripheral to the constitutional logic of Harlan's dissent because
Harlan has successfully gotten beyond race: "Our constitution is color-
blind."'14 The statute in question there was not color-blind: it made relevant
that which cannot be relevant and therefore, according to Harlan, should
have been constitutionally infirm.
Color-blind constitutionalism requires that race be irrelevant. What is
odd, though, is that in order to maintain the irrelevancy of race-in order to
know that race is irrelevant-it must first be recognized. Neil Gotanda calls
this the technique of nonrecognition:
Nonrecognition has three elements. First, there must be
something which is cognizable as a racial characteristic or
classification. Second, the characteristic must be recognized.
Third, the characteristic must not be considered in a decision.
For nonrecognition to make sense, it must be possible to
recognize something while not including it in making a deci-
sion. 5
By invoking the Plessy dissent, the Romer majority sets up the architecture
of a sexuality-blind constitutionalism, complete with the technique of non-
recognition as a way of testing whether decision making was tainted by
improper consideration of sexuality. For the Romer majority, the constitu-
tional infirmity of Colorado's Amendment 2 comes from the fact that minor-
ity sexual orientation was improperly considered or targeted, making rele-
vant that which is not supposed to be relevant. One problem with the Romer
majority's sexuality-blind constitutionalism is that the Court engaged in a
willful blindness to sex, a willful forgetting of Bowers v. Hardwick, as
Scalia in dissent 6 and other commentators have noted.'7 The result then is
an empty sort of protection as Todd Hughes has noted: "[A]n equal protec-
tion gained only for status is not equal at all; it simply protects a
name-homosexual, gay, lesbian-without protecting any content the life
same way that color-blind constitutionalism requires that race be irrelevant, the Court's
equal protection analysis in Romer requires that sexual minority status be irrelevant.
Thus, when the Court found that Amendment 2 was infected by animus against gays,
lesbians, and bisexuals, this was deemed offensive to the Equal Protection Clause be-
cause it made relevant that which cannot be relevant.
14 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"' Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV.
1, 16-17 (1991).
16 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"' See, e.g., Todd Hughes, Making Romer Work, 33 CAL. W. L. REv. 169, 172
(1997) ("In Hardwick we are only the sex we have, while in Romer we don't appear to
have sex at all.").
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attached to that name may have."' 8 What we have then is a move toward a
sexuality-blind and color-blind constitutionalism that achieves its effect by
erasing sexuality and race.
Evidence of the erasure of race can be seen in Romer. Plessy is in-
voked,19 but race has dropped out of the discourse. This cryptic
(non)reference to race is the product of the new race-less society. Anyone
who speaks of race directly except to reject it has become a partner of Louis
Farrakhan and David Duke.'0 The Romer majority avoids this pitfall by
referring to the common misunderstanding of Plessy, i.e., that the Plessy
dissent is a race-neutral decision that is modem in tone. However, as Profes-
sor Gabriel Chin points out, while this may be how the case is taught in law
schools, this is an ahistorical interpretation of the opinion.2 This ahistorical
interpretation of the Plessy dissent repeats the ahistorical error committed by
Harlan when he declared the color-blindness of the Constitution, a statement
made possible by the Framers' careful use of language:
The framers['] ... deliberate avoidance of the words "slave"
and "slavery" (and "negro" and "African" and "white") is
significant. Don Fehrenbacher minted a good figure of
speech to describe the framers' doubleness, their specific
reluctant provisions about slavery but their refusal to name
it: "It is as though the Framers were half-consciously trying
to frame two constitutions, one for their own time and the
other for the ages, with slavery viewed bifocally-that is,
plainly visible at their feet, but disappearing when they lifted
their eyes."'
This doubleness of vision also plagued the first Justice Harlan. Follow-
ing the Framers, Harlan, in Plessy, wrote two dissents. The one for the ages
states:
[I]n view of the constitution, in the eye of the law, there is
in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens.
There is no caste here. Our constitution is color-blind, and
1" Id. at 173.
19 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623.
2o Cf. Charles R. Lawrence IlI, The Epidemiology of Color-Blindness: Learning to
Think and Talk about Race, Again, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 14-16 (1995).
21 See Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82
IOWA L. REV. 151 (1996).
2 WILLIAM LEE MILLER, ARGUING ABOUT SLAVERY: THE GREAT BATrLE IN THE
UNITED STATES CONGRESS 21 (1995) (quoting DON E. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY,
LAW, AND POLITICS: THE DRED SCOTT CASE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 15 (1981)).
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neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect
of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The
humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards
man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of
his color when his civil rights as guarantied by the supreme
law of the land are involved.3
But plainly visible at his feet are his white supremacist and anti-Asian
views. His white supremacy is apparent in the words immediately preceding
his dissent for the ages:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in educa-
tion, in wealth, and in power. So, I doubt not, it will contin-
ue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage,
and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty.4
We see then that given the natural dominance of the white race (made possi-
ble by the Founders' submerged constitution that enabled slavery'), it need
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
2 Derrick Bell's heroine Geneva Crenshaw tells the Founders at the Constitutional
Convention, "Despite your resort to euphemisms like persons to keep out of the Consti-
tution such words as slave and slavery, you cannot evade the consequences of the ten
different provisions you have placed in the Constitution for the purpose of protecting
property in slaves." DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELusIvE QUEST
FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 34-35 (1987). These ten provisions are:
1. Article I, Section 2: representatives in the House were apportioned among the
states on the basis of population, computed by counting all free persons and three-
fifths of the slaves (the "federal number," or "three-fifths," clause);
2. Article I, Section 2, and Article I, Section 9: two clauses requiring, redun-
dantly, that direct taxes (including capitations) be apportioned among the states on
the foregoing basis, the purpose being to prevent Congress from laying a head tax
on slaves to encourage their emancipation;
3. Article I, Section 9: Congress was prohibited from abolishing the internation-
al slave trade to the United States before 1808;
4. Article IV, Section 2: the states were prohibited from emancipating fugitive
slaves, who were to be returned on demand of the master;
5. Article I, Section 8: Congress empowered to provide for calling up the states'
militias to suppress insurrections, including slave uprisings;
6. Article IV, Section 4: the federal government was obliged to protect the states
against domestic violence, including slave insurrections;
7. Article V: the provisions of Article I, Section 9, clauses 1 and 4 (pertaining
to the slave trade and direct taxes) were made unamendable;
8. Article I, Section 9, and Article I, Section 10: these two clauses prohibited
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not resort to statutes such as the one in Louisiana that unnaturally (or un-
necessarily) degrades or debases the negro race. This is especially the case
when that same statute, through its silence, permits Chinese persons to sit
with whites in railway cars. Harlan expressed his disapproval in a later part
of the opinion:
There is a race so different from our own that we do not
permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United
States. Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions,
absolutely excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese
race. But, by the statute in question, a Chinaman can ride in
the same passenger coach with white citizens of the United
States, while citizens of the black race in Louisiana [can-
not].26
That citizens of the black race cannot, while non-citizen Chinese can, seems
absurd to Harlan, especially when some of these black citizens might have
"risked their lives for the preservation of the Union" 27 and because if it
were up to him, persons of Chinese ancestry born in the United States
would be denied citizenship.'
The overtones of white supremacy and anti-Asian animus, which are
clearly stated in a full reading of the opinion, are left out of most of the
edited versions that we teach our law students." This editing may explain
why this generation of Justices and law clerks does not have a good handle
on what the Plessy dissent means.
the federal government and the states from taxing exports, one purpose being to
prevent them from taxing slavery indirectly by taxing the exported products of
slave labor.
Id. (quoting WILLIAM WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA: 1760-1848, at 62-63 (1977)).
26 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 561 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
27 Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
2 See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 731 (1898) (Fuller, C.J.,
dissenting, joined by Harlan, J.) ("It is not to be admitted that the children of [Chinese]
persons so situated become citizens by the accident of birth."). Despite what most com-
mentators have stated, Harlan voted in a fairly consistent fashion against the rights of
Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans. See Chin, supra note 21. A notable ex-
ception was Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
29 See Chin, supra note 21. Professor Chin notes that almost all casebooks exclude
this language, one exception being a book that is not normally used in constitutional
law classes. See id. (the notable exception being POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW: A CIVIL
RIGHTS READER (Leslie Bender & Daan Braveman eds., 1995)).
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Similarly, a court has to be somewhat clueless" to cite, in an opinion
like Romer, in an unselfconscious manner, the Civil Rights Cases for the
proposition that "the Fourteenth Amendment did not give Congress a gener-
al power to prohibit discrimination in public accommodations."3 A more
accurate constitutional history would acknowledge that the Court's jurispru-
dence, particularly in Heart of Atlanta v. United States,32 calls this under-
standing into question.3
However, the education of Supreme Court law clerks, who are almost
always recent law school graduates from elite institutions, may explain why
the Romer majority is able to accept the plaintiffs' description of themselves
as gay and lesbian and reject the defendants' attribution of the plaintiffs as
conduct-laden homosexuals.' Law teachers, partially in response to the
demands of gay and lesbian students, have begun to speak of the unspeak-
able and help students and future law clerks understand issues like sodomy
and gay/lesbian/bisexual rights. This has been true particularly at places like
Yale, Columbia, Harvard, and Stanford where Janet Halley, Kendall Thom-
as, Harlon Dalton, and Ken Karst, among others, have helped to alter the
nature of the assumptions students make about sexual orientation. While
much work remains to be done in educating future practitioners, professors,
judges, and justices with regard to sexual orientation, it remains an unfortu-
nate failing of legal education that it has not taught a fuller and more accu-
rate picture of race. The clearest way to understand the unfortunate conse-
quences of this deficiency in what we teach about race is to understand the
Court's use of race in the heart of its opinion about "special rights."
"Special rights" is always a code word for the racialization of equal
protection. The Romer majority rejects the application of "special rights" as
applying to the claims of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, but the Court does
not address or explain how its "special rights" discourse applies to racial
issues, other than through a cryptic reference to the Civil Rights Cases.
After all, the assumption of "special rights" is at the heart of the O'Connor
Court, and its misguided ahistorical path is what makes our racial juris-
3 A less generous reading is disingenuousness.
31 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1625 (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883)).
379 U.S. 241 (1964).
3 See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAw 123-36 (1992).
See generally Hughes, supra note 17. Hughes comments that
in Hardwick, the legal identity of gays and lesbians, at least as articulated by the
Court's opinion, included nothing but the ability to commit sodomy and eliminat-
ed any identity with family or community .... By linking identity with a sexual
activity, the Court dehumanized and depersonalized gay men and lesbians by
removing all other aspects of personal and social identity.
Id. at 171.
3" For a discussion of O'Connor's influence on the Court, see Jerome McCristal
Culp, Jr., An Open Letter from One Black Scholar to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Or,
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prudence so nonsensical.36 If the Court believes what it says in Romer, that
antidiscrimination legislation protecting gays, lesbians, and bisexuals does
not grant special rights (contrasted with the unstated special rights that mi-
norities receive), then the majority ought to be able to say, "Proposition 209
classifies racial minorities not to further a proper legislative end but to con-
tinue to allow them to be unequal to everyone else." After all, if racial mi-
norities do receive special rights and really are the "special favorites" of the
law, then the Court should treat us as such. That the Court has not said this
and is unlikely to say this in the near future suggests that the Court has
bought into the notion that is at the heart of the special rights argument.
Those who advance a special rights argument seem to believe that the
Equal Protection Clause provides special rights to racial minorities. An early
form of these special rights took the form of strict scrutiny based on foot-
note 4 of Carolene Products,37 which suggested that legislation affecting a
discrete and insular minority may merit a more searching scrutiny.3" Racial
minorities, as discrete and insular minorities, are vulnerable to-the tyranny
of the majority and therefore required special protections. This more search-
ing judicial inquiry took the form of strict scrutiny when racial classifica-
tions were used, although we find it ironic that this special protection was
granted in Korematsu v. United States,39 one of the cases that upheld the
How Not to Become Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 21
(1994).
36 Compare the different histories in O'Connor's plurality opinion with Marshall's
dissent in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). See also Peter C.
Hoffer, "Blind to History": The Use of History in Affirmative Action Suits: Another
Look at City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 23 RUTGERS L.J. 271 (1992); Thomas
Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEx. L. REV. 381 (1989).
A similar sort of ahistoricity makes possible the Hopwood decision. See Hopwood
v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). The appellate court rejected the history contained
in the district court opinion, Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 554-57 (W.D. Tex.
1994), and substituted its own story of a law school that has not had de jure segregation
since 1950 as a result of Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), and where "[a]ny
other discrimination by the law school ended in the 1960s." Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 953.
Within this narrow time frame, "there will never be any present-day effects of a law
school's past discrimination on present-day minority applicants, especially as we move
further, temporally, from de jure segregation." Robert S. Chang, Reverse Racism!: Affir-
mative Action, the Family, and the Dream that Is America, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
1115, 1119 (1996).
3" Carolene Prods. v. United States, 304 U.S. 144 (1938). The relevant portion of
footnote 4 states that the Court had to decide "whether prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the opera-
tion of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Id. at 153 n.4.
38 See id.
9 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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exclusion and internment of Japanese Americans." Note, though, that "spe-
cial protections" does not mean the same thing as "special rights." Further,
the special protection provided by strict scrutiny, like the Founders' consti-
tution and Harlan's dissent in Plessy, was race-neutral.
This race neutrality is evident in recent Supreme Court decisions in
which most of the successful plaintiffs who have benefitted from the special
protection provided by strict scrutiny have been white.4' This shows that
the Court's understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment has come a long
way since Justice Miller's pronouncement in the Slaughter-House Cases:
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not di-
rected by way of discrimination against the negroes as a
class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come
within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a pro-
vision for that race and that emergency, that a strong case
would be necessary for its application to any other.42
The fact that the recent Supreme Court cases are so far afield from Justice
Miller's understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment can again be attributed
to the doubleness of the Constitution, including that amendment. If the
Fourteenth Amendment had been race-specific, it would have been an ac-
knowledgment of what cannot be acknowledged. And that which is not
acknowledged can eventually be forgotten or erased.43
As a result, even though the special protections provided by the Four-
teenth Amendment are race-neutral, special rights in the imagination of
white Americans are not. Special rights reside in the bodies of people of
color and in this sense means rights that white Americans do not have. This
contradicts the mythic idea of a color-blind constitution that knows no caste
and makes no distinctions based on race. "Special rights," then, such as may
be found in affirmative action or provisions in the Voting Rights Act, must
be constitutionally offensive. Under this view, whiteness has become a prop-
4 The other cases that upheld various measures enforcing exclusion and internment
of Japanese Americans were Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), and
Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943).
41 See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70
(1995); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
42 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1873).
4' This may explain why the task of recovery is so important in critical race theory,
whether it takes the form of narrativizing the experiences of persons of color or the
form of critical legal historiography. See, e.g., PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF
RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR (1991); Kendall Thomas, Rouge et
Noir Reread: A Popular Constitutional History of the Angelo Herndon Case, 65 S. CAL.
L. REV. 2599 (1992).
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erty right which is improperly trammeled upon by all those special rights
that minorities receive." Constitutional benefit or remedy for racial minori-
ties is reread as constitutional harm to whites. This ethnocentric assumption
is now the dominant interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 45 Exam-
ining the way that the Court in Romer does (not) deal with race will help us
to understand what the Court did and did not do in Romer and what its im-
plications are for racial and sexual minorities.
II. NOTHING AND EVERYTHING
If we are correct and Romer is quintessentially always a race case, the
first question that has to be answered is how the majority in Romer was able
to ignore the racial implications. There are two ways that this is accom-
plished. First, the Court accepts in at least three places ahistorical interpreta-
tions of our constitutional history that helps to read race out of the dis-
course. The Court's interpretation of Plessy, the Civil Rights Cases, and
public accommodations law sets up the principle of neutrality that allows for
the recognition of race and sexuality but which ultimately erases them. Sec-
ond, the majority does not understand-or cannot deal with-the fact that
special rights is always and everywhere about race. That the religious right
understands this can be seen in its attempt to persuade traditional civil rights
communities that gays and lesbians sought special rights in a way that co-
opted and demeaned traditional civil rights efforts."
In Romer, Justice Kennedy begins his discussion of the interaction of
antidiscrimination statutes and equal protection with this strange quote:
"At common law, innkeepers, smiths, and others who 'made
profession of a public employment,' were prohibited from
See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709
(1993).
" See supra note 41 (citing Croson, Adarand, Jenkins, and Shaw).
46 For an excellent discussion of the way "special rights" was used in the campaign
in Colorado for Amendment 2, see Margaret M. Russell, Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual
Rights and "The Civil Rights Agenda," 1 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 33, 45-52 (1994).
The main premises of that campaign were:
(1) that declaring one's minority sexual orientation, unlike acknowledging one's
minority race, was a conscious choice to behave in a stigmatized manner (after
all, one "couldn't do anything about" being African-American or Latino); (2) that
the putative "civil right" protected by the inclusion of "sexual orientation" in
antidiscrimination laws was actually the right to engage in "deviant" sexual rela-
tions; and (3) that such behavior constituted not an "equal right" in the sense in
which traditional antidiscrimination laws had been crafted, but rather an unwar-
ranted "special right" to "flaunt" an unconventional lifestyle.
Id. at 45-46.
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refusing, without good reason, to serve a customer." Hurley
v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Bos-
ton, Inc., 515 U.S. [557], [570], 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2346, 132
L. Ed. 2d 487 (1995). The duty was a general one and did
not specify protection for particular groups. The common
law rules, however, proved insufficient in many instances,
and it was settled early that the Fourteenth Amendment did
not give Congress a general power to prohibit discrimination
in public accommodations, [The] Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 25, 3 S. Ct. 18, 31-32, 27 L. Ed. 835 (1883). 47
One might have thought that this was exactly the place to introduce and
compare the racial circumstances or, at a minimum, to say how gay and les-
bian issues are different in kind from those raised by race and gender. In-
stead, the Romer Court accepts the history of public accommodations ac-
cepted by the majority in the Civil Rights Cases. This view of the role of
public accommodations has clearly been called into question by the Court's
opinion in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States.4 In that case, the Court
upheld Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act based upon Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause. However, Justice Clark noted that Congress
had also based its power to enact this legislation on Section 5 of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Clark said, "This is
not to say that the remaining authority upon which it acted was not ade-
quate, a question upon which we do not pass, but merely that since the
commerce power is sufficient for our decision here we have considered it
alone." '49 Justice Clark went on to explain that the Civil Rights Cases were
not implicated by this commerce power because the Commerce Clause had
not been considered by the Court in the Civil Rights Cases. It is not clear,
though, whether the basic point in the Civil Rights Cases that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not give Congress the power to regulate private concerns
is still good law. What is clear is that the history adopted by the Court in
1883 and acknowledged by the Court in Romer is wrong. As Joseph Singer
has noted, a more accurate history of the pre-Fourteenth Amendment com-
mon law regarding public accommodations would have concluded that
[o]nly after the Civil War did the law in the United States
clearly authorize most businesses to choose their customers
at will. This occurred only after African-Americans were
granted civil rights. Reversing the presumption of access and
substituting a right to exclude served to limit these newfound
4 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1625.
379 U.S. 241 (1964).
49 Id. at 250.
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civil rights. Only after the issue of public access became
thoroughly enmeshed in the issue of racial segregation did
the current common-law rule obtain its present form.5"
Although this history of public accommodations is buried within the Su-
preme Court's jurisprudence, the Court has the power to reject the racist de-
velopment of the common law with regard to public accommodations. With
respect to cases like the Civil Rights Cases, it is important for the Court to
do so. If the Romer Court had rejected the racist development of the com-
mon law regarding public accommodations, the Court could have made the
argument that the original common law rule, changed originally for racist
reasons, should apply to gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. But because race has
nothing to do with the rights created for gays and lesbians (or for women),
the Court is lost in separate fields of analysis.5 If the Court is to make the
Fourteenth Amendment live up to its potential to be the harbinger of equali-
ty, it has the burden of understanding how race is involved when public
accommodations are implicated.
Goaded by our two-hundred-year history of being unable to deal with
race, contemporary America does not know when it can acknowledge race
or racism. Charles Lawrence likens America's inability to deal with race to
a dysfunctional family's denial of its secret shame:
In dysfunctional families, where there is alcoholism, abuse,
or incest, children and other family members learn that they
are not to speak of this behavior to others. Often the behav-
ior is not even spoken of within the family. These taboos
may be enforced by threat of further abuse, but they are also
enforced by fear of loss of love, or guilt, or a diminished
self-worth that leads the child to think he deserves the abuse,
or to the child's participation in the denial. Analogous mech-
anisms serve to enforce the taboo against speaking candidly
about what we see and know about racism.52
Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private
Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283, 1344-45 (1996).
" Kimberle Crenshaw makes this point about the inability of courts to deal with
race and gender simultaneously in Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139. Angela Harris makes this point in the context of
feminist legal theory in Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581 (1990).
2 Lawrence, supra note 20, at 9. The public debate surrounding the proposed offi-
cial governmental apology for slavery presents just one more example of the feathers
that get ruffled when accountability for slavery is raised. See Richard Matthews, Edito-
rial, Slavery Apology Dead: The Race Issue Is Still Too Big for Most of Us, ATLANTA
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It is clear that, for many, to document racism is to improperly raise the
issue of race. Otherwise, it is hard to make sense of commentators criticiz-
ing Nike for pointing out in an advertisement that there are still golf courses
that will not allow Tiger Woods to play because of his race,53 or commen-
tators who criticize John Hope Franklin, as chair of the Clinton advisory
board on race, for stating that "[racism pervaded American life,"54 and
board member Angela Oh for stating that "the panel should not waste its
time documenting the extent of discrimination because it was so wide-
spread."" The Supreme Court seems to suffer from this same inability to
deal with race.
Race is the unseen presence in the understanding of public accommoda-
tions, and race is the unseen presence in the argument advanced by the de-
fendants in Romer. The notion that the role of civil rights law is to create
"special rights" is a product of our jurisprudence on race. The Burger and
Rehnquist Courts have encouraged the general population to believe that
civil rights for racial minorities are special rights and that laws like the 1964
Civil Rights Act somehow created something for black people and other
people of color that does not exist for white people.56 The most interesting
aspect of this special rights discussion in Romer is the Court's unreflective
citation of the Civil Rights Cases. It is in the Civil Rights Cases that the
Court for the first time makes a claim that black civil rights might make
black people the special favorites of the law.
In the Civil Rights Cases, Justice Bradley suggests that the whole legal
product of the Reconstruction Era created some special status for former
slaves. He wrote:
J. & ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 7, 1997, at A22.
" See Denise Gellene, Five '30-Second Movies' Rate Emmy Nods, L.A. TIMES, July
25, 1997, at D3 (quoting Bob Garfield of Advertising Age who "accused Nike of 'play-
ing the race card' to generate athletic-shoe sales from black customers").
' Ronald Brownstein, Clinton Seeks Dialogue on Race, But He Must Go Beyond
Same Old Talk, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 1997, at A5 (paraphrasing John Hope Franklin
who said: "Our whole country, our whole practices are suffused with [racism]. Hardly
an aspect of American life has escaped the baneful touch of this awful thing called
racism.... Wherever you go, you are going to see this.").
Id. (paraphrasing Angela Oh who said: "I don't need the data. I don't think any of
us need the data; we know it's there.").
6 This understanding has permitted the creation of the discursive formation known
as the "innocent white male" and has given force to charges of reverse racism. It allows
whites to occupy a position of innocence. See DAVID R. ROEDIGER, TOwARDs THE
ABOLITION OF WHITENESS: ESSAYS ON RACE, POLITICs, AND WORKING CLASS HISTO-
RY 14 (1994) ("The destructive term 'reverse racism' grows out of this assurance
among whites that they have transcended race.").
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It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to
make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person
may see fit to make as to guests he will entertain, or as to
the people he will take into his coach or cab- or car, or admit
to his concert or theatre, or deal with in other matters of
intercourse or business. . . . When a man has emerged from
slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken
off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be
some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the
rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite
of the laws.57
This interpretation of history is strange. None of the civil rights legislation
had adopted the strategy of being just about black people. The civil rights
legislation and constitutional amendments produced by the Civil War were,
in the words of Andrew Kull,5" race-blind. All of this legislation adopted
the least intrusive method of invading the private concerns of government
and private parties and limited those actions insofar as they were based
upon the improper use of race or racial classifications. However, these race-
conscious statutes and constitutional amendments were not race-specif-
ic-none of these laws or amendments were just about black people.59
These laws provided protection for all people, including white people who
have a race, notwithstanding Justice Miller's earlier pronouncement in the
Slaughter-House Cases.' When Justice Bradley spoke of there having to
s7 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24-25 (1883) (emphasis added).
58 ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992).
9 These race-conscious but not race-specific statutes and constitutional amendments
were a continuation of the double project begun by the Founders. The race-conscious
but race-neutral language was meant for the ages. See supra text accompanying notes
22-24.
60 See supra text accompanying note 42 (quoting Miller). The full logic of this is
evident in the recent equal protection challenges brought by white plaintiffs against
minority set-asides in government contracting, against minority voting districts, and
against school desegregation plans. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989) (holding the city's plan to require prime contractors awarded city
contracts to subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount to "Minority Business Enter-
prises" a violation of equal protection); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200 (1995) (holding that any action taken by federal, local, or state government to ad-
vantage minority contractors will be analyzed under a strict scrutiny standard); Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (holding Georgia's minority redistricting plan a violation
of equal protection)); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996) (holding North Carolina's
minority redistricting plan a violation of equal protection); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515
U.S. 70 (1995) (holding a school desegregation plan unconstitutional); see also Robert
L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, The Tales of White Folk: Doctrine, Narrative, and the
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be some point when former slaves cease being the special favorites of the
law, it is hard to understand what he could have meant. The only interpre-
tation that makes sense is that Justice Bradley believed that the majority of
the country that sees itself as "white" does not have a race and therefore is
not protected by the civil rights legislation. We believe that if Justice
Bradley were to stand before us today, he might make the argument, not
that he had no race, but rather a variant on the argument made by Justice
Miller in 1873 and Justice Scalia today that these amendments were just
about black people.6 Neither argument makes 'much sense.62 After all,
even Justice Harlan in his famous dissent in Plessy spoke proudly of the
power and future of the white race. Everyone who grew up in nineteenth-
century America understood the power of race in America. President Theo-
dore Roosevelt's invitation to Booker T. Washington a generation later
could still produce a negative national response. White people did not be-
lieve that black people were their intellectual, social, or moral equals. Even
progressive movements often demonstrated the indifference to people of
color, reflected in their failure to include them.63 Race mattered, and so the
argument that somehow the Court could not see the consequences of its ac-
tions on the lives of the nonwhite citizens of the country seems particularly
absurd.
Justice Bradley seems to be arguing that, because we freed black slaves
from slavery, "what more can you ask of us." Black people for Justice
Bradley were exactly like the gay/lesbian/bisexual people that the Romer
Court found were simply seeking the rights held by others under our Con-
stitution. In 1883 in the Civil Rights Cases, the Court was unwilling or
Reconstruction of Racial Reality, 84 CAL. L. REV. 377 (1996).
61 Scalia's views are consistent with Justice Miller's. Compare The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873), with Adarand, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
62 It is not just our modern view of this language. See Harlan's dissent in the Civil
Rights Cases:
The terms of the thirteenth amendment are absolute and universal. They embrace
every race which then was, or might thereafter be, within the United States. No
race, as such, can be excluded from the benefits or rights thereby conferred. Yet it
is historically true that that amendment was suggested by the condition, in this
country, of that race which had been declared by this court to have had, according
to the opinion entertained by the most civilized portion of the white race at the
time of the adoption of the constitution, "no rights which the white man was
bound to respect," none of the privileges or immunities secured by that instrument
to citizens of the United States.
109 U.S. at 33 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
For example, participants in the feminist movement refused to allow black women
to participate in some suffrage efforts and tried to silence black women speakers at
some gatherings. This frustration is expressed very powerfully in the anthology, THIS
BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR (Cherrie
Moraga & Gloria Anzaldua eds., 2d ed., 1983).
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unable to reject the white supremacy inherent in the formulation of rights.
The Romer Court, to its credit, was able to see through the special rights
argument. In wanting to be free from discrimination in public accommoda-
tions and employment, black people were not seeking special rights in 1883.
Nor are blacks and other racial minorities seeking special rights in 1997. If
the Romer Court had an appropriate understanding of constitutional history,
it would have overruled the Civil Rights Cases on this very point and would
have adopted the language of Justice Harlan's dissent in that case:
It is, I submit, scarcely just to say that the colored race has
been the special favorite of the laws. What the nation,
through congress, has sought to accomplish in reference to
that race is, what had already been done in every state in the
Union for the white race, to secure and protect rights belong-
ing to them as freemen and citizens; nothing more. The one
underlying purpose of congressional legislation has been to
enable the black race to take the rank of mere citizens.'
The power of the Court's opinion in Romer would have been enhanced if
the Court had been willing to put the special rights debate into a better
moral and political framework that acknowledged the power of race to dis-
tort the truth.
In this sense, being a sexual minority is very much like being a racial
minority. It is another form of the Other that is excluded from constitutional
discourse. This point is central to the Court's discourse on gays, lesbians,
and bisexuals, but to use it out of context is to do a great disservice to this
history. Race is nothing to the Romer Court precisely because to see race,
the Court must acknowledge and reject some aspect of its racist past. But
one cannot reject something that is not acknowledged.' Again, the double-
ness of the Founders' constitution comes back to haunt us.
One cannot rely on the Civil Rights Cases and the Plessy dissent and
reject the notion of special rights for racial minorities. The early racial histo-
ry of the Court is built on exactly that foundation. If the Court were to
reject the language of special rights introduced by the religious right into the
debate about the rights of gays and lesbians, then race has to be nothing in
our constitutional discourse about special rights.
" The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 61 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
65 Cf. Barbara Johnson, Thresholds of Difference: Structures of Address in Zora
Neal Hurston, in "RACE," WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE 317, 323 (Henry L. Gates, Jr.
ed., 1986) ("Difference ... must be represented in order to be erased.").
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III. EVERYTHING AND NOTHING
Identity is the unwanted guest at the constitutional dinner table. Some-
how, more and more people kept coming to the constitutional door and
demanding entrance. The Court's response has been to invite them in but set
them at different tables. Racial groups have been put at the table for chil-
dren in the other room with the stem, slightly deaf aunt keeping order with
a simple paddle called strict scrutiny; gender has been placed at the young
adult table in the main room but at a slightly lower elevation and without
the grownup choices. People without identity concerns are allowed to sit
with the grownups at the big table in the main dining room and to use all of
the choices that are available to the real grownups. Unlike the teenagers or
the children, they are allowed to abuse and satiate themselves with whatever
strikes their fancy. If they want a congressional district which protects to-
bacco interests, that is "rational" and is permitted among grownups; but it is
not permitted for those seated at the children's table to form such desires,
and a watchful eye is kept on the gender table in the same room. If those at
the children's table are to ever get to the grownup table, they have to leave
their identity behind. Only if they come to the door without identity can
they be allowed all the choices given other people. The Court has never said
precisely what this might mean because it has no possible intelligible mean-
ing. For gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, it was exactly this ambiguity that
permitted them to get to the grownup table. Romer permitted rational basis
because it treated the plaintiffs as persons whose sexual orientations were
peripheral to their identity as persons. But what can this mean?
The problem for the Court with this constitutional picture is that it is a
thin and nonsensical interpretation of identity even in terms that the Court
wants to apply. What does Justice O'Connor mean when she suggests that
the five white plaintiffs in Shaw v. Reno did not claim a racial identity:
In their complaint, appellants did not claim that the General
Assembly's reapportionment plan unconstitutionally "diluted"
white voting strength. They did not even claim to be white.
Rather, appellants' complaint alleged that the deliberate seg-
regation of voters into separate districts on the basis of race
violated their constitutional right to participate in a "color-
blind" electoral process.66
Is Justice O'Connor claiming that these individuals do not have an identity,
or that their claim transcends their identity? Justice O'Connor would like the
' Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641-42 (1993) (emphasis added).
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answer to be the latter, in line with the consistent trend to ignore the racial
crimes that form the corpus of United States history by declaring victory
and going home.67 Unfortunately for the Court, it is hard to create a color-
blind process without first acknowledging how to be blind to people's iden-
tities. If the five white plaintiffs are able to shuck their racial identity and
come to the Court racially naked, then nothing else needs to be done about
race. Race by definition has been eliminated from their claim, and all that is
left is to remove race from those who have kept their racial identity intact.
The problem with this formulation of racial identity is that it does not
require any change in the status quo. The five white plaintiffs in Shaw v.
Reno gave up nothing to be without racial identity, and the state political69
and economic system has not been altered by their decision to forgo their
race. The use of identity that permits these plaintiffs to come to the table
and demand rights is their decision to leave the racial status quo unchanged
by their denial of identity. What does identity mean to Justice O'Connor in
this context? For her and a majority of the Court, it is simply an act of will
and positioning with no real meaning. For the black citizens of North Caro-
lina, being black is always and everywhere meaningful in how they are
treated by public officials and what they will earn. The O'Connor Court has
found that societal discrimination cannot produce race-based actions. Yet,
for the black people of North Carolina, the societal discrimination that
leaves them poorer and with less political power is very real. Constitutional-
ly, they cannot afford to arrive racially naked at the equal protection ban-
quet. If the Court were willing to look behind the rationale for the concern
by the plaintiffs in the voting district cases, it would find that they are at
least partially driven by concerns about being placed in districts that are
seen as black.7" A harder look might even reveal that the plaintiffs were
67 This trend simply repeats what Bradley did in the Civil Rights Cases when he
declared victory (the slaves were freed!) and that nothing more need be done.
6 In order to say that you did not take race into account, you must first acknowl-
edge that a racial category is implicated before saying that it did not influence your
decision. This is precisely Neil Gotanda's nonrecognition thesis. See Gotanda, supra
note 15.
69 George Will and a number of other conservative commentators have argued that
the 1996 congressional elections vindicated the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regard-
ing race because the black incumbents who ran for reelection in southern congressional
districts reapportioned under the Court's opinions won. See George F. Will, Good
News? Don't Want to Hear About It, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 1996, at A31. This claim is
off-base for three reasons. First, some of these incumbents would have lost if the top of
the ticket had been closer in these districts. In fact, President Clinton's reelection as a
quasi-Republican centrist helped protect some of these incumbents. Second, these con-
gressmen and women were running as incumbents and not seeking open seats. Part of
their ability to win reelection stemmed from the incumbency factor and because none of
them were challenged by serious white opposition in primaries. Third, it has yet to be
proved that the 1996 election results are sustainable over a long period of time.
" This is reminiscent of the fear of guilt by association that permitted tort claims to
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concerned that they might be represented by a black person, someone who
might not "represent" their (non-racialized) interests. 71 If the Court is going
to find that someone has given up identity, it needs to inquire further.
Also, it might be said that the white plaintiffs, in not claiming any racial
position, have not given up anything. Insofar as whiteness is the norm or
universal position, it becomes invisible. 72 Thus, for racial minorities to give
up a racial identity, we must accept the universal. We must become (virtual-
ly) normal-we must become white.
The point, in short, is that the Court has an unquenchable hankering for
a world in which racial identity doesn't exist. This cry for removing identity
shows up in cases from Wygant to Adarand,4 but it has no depth or
meaning because the Court does not' have a working definition of identity.
This is clear from the Court's discussion of racial and gender identity in the
V.M.I. case.7' Justice Ginsburg said:
Supposed "inherent differences" are no longer accepted as a
ground for race or national origin classifications. See Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Physical differences between
men and women, however, are enduring: "[T]he two sexes
are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one
[sex] is different from a community composed of both."
Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946). Inherent
differences" between men and women, we have come to
appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigra-
tion of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints
on an individual's opportunity. Sex classifications may be
used to compensate women "for particular economic disabili-
ties [they have] suffered," Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S.
be brought by white persons who were named in newspaper articles if the mention of
their names was close to a picture of a black person. See Anthony Farley, Panel Presen-
tation, 1995 Western Law Teachers of Color Conference, San Diego, California.
71 That a white representative might not "represent" black constituents is simply the
product of neutral majoritarian democracy and is not problematic under traditional con-
stitutional analysis.
7 See Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness
and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993); see also
STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDER-
MINES AMERICA (1996) (with contributions by Margalynne Armstrong, Adrienne D.
Davis, & Trina Grillo).
73 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
7' United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (holding that the exclusion of
females by the Commonwealth from a citizen-soldier program at a Virginia military
college was a violation of equal protection).
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313, 320 (1977) (per curiam), to "promot[e] equal employ-
ment opportunity," see California Federal Sav. & Loan Assn.
v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987), to advance full devel-
opment of the talent and capacities of our Nation's people.
But such classifications may not be used, as they once were,
see Goesaert, 335 U.S., at 467, to create or perpetuate the
legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.76
This is an extremely interesting description of racial and gender identity and
the relationship between them. Justice Ginsburg starts by claiming that there
are no inherent differences that are constitutionally cognizable among the
races and cites to Loving, a case about the use of racial classifications to
regulate marriage.77 Racial identity from a constitutional perspective is not
about differences. 7 Justice Ginsburg describes gender identity as being
about differences that we appreciate. 79 From this, we might surmise that
any differences that exist among the races are not the kind we are to appre-
ciate."0 This formulation makes racial and gender identity and classifications
unrelated to each other.
We can appreciate that gender identity, as it has been constructed with
appreciable differences, may create the need for classifications to promote
equal employment opportunity for women, but the erasure of identity means
that for blacks and other racial minorities, the appreciation stops. When a
76 Id. at 2276.
17 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). It is interesting that the Court in Romer
also cites to a miscegenation case, the precursor to Loving. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at
1626 (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)). This citation to McLaughlin
is an interesting one, given that there are earlier cases available for the proposition that
race merits heightened scrutiny. McLaughlin, in addition to being about race, is also
about sex. It is one of the few times that sex makes its way into the Romer majority
opinion. See Hughes, supra note 17, at 172.
78 By not recognizing differences, the Court essentially is legislating racial sameness.
This is part of the classic dialectic of reaction to prejudice. Anthony Appiah notes:
The thesis in this dialectic-which Du Bois reports as the American Negro's
attempt to "minimize race distinctions"-is the denial of difference. Du Bois's
antithesis is the acceptance of difference, along with a claim that each group has
its part to play.
Anthony Appiah, The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the Illusion of Race, in
"RACE," WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 65, at 21, 25.
7 Justice Ginsburg has accepted what Appiah terms the classic dialectic in femi-
nism: "[O]n the one hand, a simple claim to equality, a denial of substantial difference;
on the other, a claim to a special message, revaluing the feminine Other not as the help-
meet of sexism, but as the New Woman." Id. at 25.
'0 Does this appreciation of differences bode ill for the forthcoming constitutional
challenge by gays and lesbians to marriage laws? One interpretation of it would suggest
that it does.
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Latina/o, Asian, or black person is stopped at the border and harassed differ-
ently than a white person, the lack of appreciation feels very real."
The Court's formulation of identity, with racial identity as artificial and
gender identity as real, is nonsensical from a theoretical and practical per-
spective. 2 The Court's acceptance of this formulation leaves race out of
the picture. It is not real and therefore can be ignored. Sort of.
Courts like to have it both ways. Racial identity is both fixed and fluid.
It is fixed when the court in Podberesky v. Kirwan83 described Daniel
Podberesky as Hispanic. Podberesky is a Fourth Circuit case involving the
successful challenge of a scholarship program adopted by the University of
Maryland to provide scholarships to African Americans. Because Hispanic is
not a racial description' and because Podberesky's father is a non-Hispan-
ic white Jewish lawyer with the Department of Transportation in Washing-
ton, D.C., and his mother was born in Ecuador,85 one might ask what His-
panic means in this context. We do not mean to denigrate his Hispanic bona
fides, but the court does not require anything and then makes a racial classi-
fication out of the claim to say that Maryland is excluding nonwhite persons
such as Daniel Podberesky.8 6 From the known facts, Podberesky is at least
81 See Robert S. Chang & Keith Aoki, Centering the Immigrant in the Inter/National
Imagination (Part I), 85 CAL. L. REV., 10 LA RAZA L.J. (forthcoming 1997); Ibrahim
Gassama, et al., Foreword: Centering the Immigrant in the Inter/National Imagination
(Part II), 76 OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997); see generally Symposium, Citizenship
and Its Discontents, 76 OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997).
82 Although we disagree with the Court's treatment of race as artificial and therefore
ignorable, we believe that race is socially constructed. See generally MICHAEL OMI &
HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960s TO
THE 1990s (2d ed. 1994). The fact that race is socially constructed does not in any way
make it less "real."
83 46 F.3d 5 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995).
See Bureau of the Census, Official 1990 U.S. Census Form (1990). See generally
Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and 'the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, African
Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161 (1997); Luis Angel Toro, "A
People Distinct from Others": Race and Identity in Federal Indian Law and the His-
panic Classification in OMB Directive No. 15, 26 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 1219, 1225-26
(1995); Kenneth Payson, Comment, Check One Box: Directive No. 15, and the Classifi-
cation of Mixed-Race People, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1233, 1241 (1996).
8 The opinion does not refer to the race of Daniel Podberesky's mother which, of
course, could be white. Although it is possible that she is Black or Asian, this is unlike-
ly; otherwise, the court would have described Daniel differently.
86 Podberesky's ambiguous racial identity distinguishes this from traditional reverse
racism claims brought by white plaintiffs as in the Hopwood case. In this sense,
Podberesky's situation is similar to the Lowell High School controversy where a group
of Chinese American plaintiffs challenged a desegregation consent decree at a selective
public high school in San Francisco. See Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 965 F.
Supp. 1316 (N.D. Cal. 1997). For discussions of the legal and political ramifications of
that controversy, see Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just Black
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half white and could be completely white depending on what definition of
race we use. However, the court, for the purpose of questioning the Univer-
sity of Maryland and the state of Maryland's decision to continue funding
the Banneker Scholarship, treats Podberesky simply as a Hispanic and uses
that description to mean nonwhite.
However, when the court looked to see whether the actions of the pro-
gram met the narrow tailoring of strict scrutiny, the court found that the
district court erred in not taking account of the fact that African Americans
outside Maryland and at least one Jamaican were given Banneker Scholar-
ships. Racial identity does not extend outside the state boundaries
presumably because the injuries caused by past discrimination by the Uni-
versity of Maryland do not.
This seems wrong. The racial discrimination by the University of Mary-
land clearly was not limited to people in the state. One suspects that the
Fourth Circuit would have criticized the university if it did or did not admit
people from outside the state. To the Fourth Circuit, race means what they
say it does in these contexts. This is clearest in the court's discussion of the
remedy it would provide for Mr. Podberesky. In the last footnote of the case
the court said, "Podberesky, also, has not asked for relief against any other
student who has been awarded a Banneker scholarship prior to this decision;
therefore, this decision has no effect on such students." ' In this footnote,
the Fourth Circuit may have been attempting to assuage concerns of plain-
tiffs, but it seems an odd point to make. No one has ever thought of getting
back scholarships or degrees from white students who were the beneficiaries
of segregation before recent relief 8 The court seems to suggest that race,
and White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957, 971-72 (1995); Selena Dong, Note, "Too
Many Asians": The Challenge of Fighting Discrimination Against Asian-Americans and
Preserving Affirmative Action, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1995).
" Podberesky, 46 F.3d 5, 6 (4th Cir. 1994) (rewriting the footnote on page 162 of
the original opinion to avoid possible ambiguity).
8 This point applies more broadly to quite a number of beneficiaries of racial dis-
crimination. For example, when white workers with seniority were laid off ahead of
recently hired racial minorities, they successfully challenged the layoffs. Even though
they had gotten the jobs and accrued seniority in part through the racial discrimination
that prevented competition from racial minorities, this ill-gotten, undeserved benefit
became part of their settled expectations that were off limits for affirmative action
hirings and firings. See Harris, Whiteness as Property, supra note 44, at 1776.
This raises the broader question of what sort of reparations, if any, are ever appro-
priate for past discrimination. See Rhonda V. Magee, Note, The Master's Tools, From
the Bottom Up: Responses to African-American Reparations Theory in Mainstream and
Outsider Remedies Discourse, 79 VA. L. REV. 863 (1993). The lack of reparations for
blacks may be contrasted with the redress obtained by Japanese Americans for their
internment during World War II. See generally LESLIE T. HATAMIYA, RIGHTING A
WRONG: JAPANESE AMERICANS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE CIVIL LIBERTIES ACT OF
1988 (1993). These questions have gained renewed prominence with the debate in Con-
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when used for Banneker Scholarships, forever marks those recipients as the
beneficiaries of this racialized system and that if Podberesky had asked, it
would have withdrawn those rewards. From this, we see that race as identity
is whatever the court wants it to be.
This confusion is also clear in the Supreme Court's opinion in Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group.9 In Hurley, the issue
was whether Massachusetts public accommodations law required the parade
organizers of the St. Patrick's Day parade to permit a gay, lesbian, and bi-
sexual group to be included in the parade. The Court concluded that it can-
not require this because the parade belongs to its organizers, and they have
a right to control the expression included in the parade. This Article will not
address whether that conclusion is a reasonable or accurate portrayal of what
the St. Patrick's Day Parade is in Boston, but we will examine the use of
identity by the Court.9" In a unanimous decision, the Court concluded that
the public accommodations statute was not implicated because gay, lesbian,
and bisexual individuals were not excluded from the parade.
The petitioners disclaim any intent to exclude homosexuals,
as such, and no individual member of GLIB claims to have
been excluded from parading as a member of any group that
the Council ... has approved to march.9'
The Court assumed that identity is individual and not associated with the
right to be a member of a group. It is also assumed that the notion of iden-
tity is unchanged after the creation of gay, lesbian, and bisexual identities.
The Court calls these individuals homosexuals, therefore transforming them
into conduct-laden individuals.92 The plaintiffs sued as a group of connect-
ed political beings. By ignoring their self/group description, the Court does
not require us to face the hard question about the reach of the public accom-
modations statute. Identity in Hurley is this thin refusal to see the real iden-
tity that these gay/lesbian/bisexual individuals as a group claim. Simply put,
gay/lesbian/bisexual rights, like the rights of racial minorities, can never be
merely individualistic.93 The groupness of race and gender and sexual ori-
entation creates unresolved and perhaps unresolvable tensions for legal liber-
gress over the appropriateness of an official apology for slavery.
9 515 U.S. 557 (1995), rev'g 513 U.S. 1071 (1995).
The plaintiffs did not assert that there was no state action, though such a conces-
sion does not mean that the Court will not make an independent investigation of its
own. See id.
9I Id. at 572 (emphasis added).
See Hughes, supra note 17, at 172.
Remember, individuals must shed certain identity markers before they may sit at
the grownup table.
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alism which focuses on the rights of the autonomous individuated self. The
question for the Constitution is whether it can pay attention to an identity
that does not come as a filtered imitation of others but redefines our notion
of ourselves. A deep understanding of the self requires everyone to recog-
nize and acknowledge that they have a race and a gender and a sexual ori-
entation, even if white heteropatriarchal privilege permits certain persons to
never think of themselves as such. Such redefinitions may be required by
inclusion of other cultures in our body politic as well.
The problem for the Court is the problem of America as it prepares to
enter a new millennium. With the emergence of gays/lesbians/bisexuals from
the prison that is called the closet,94 the entry of numerous immigrants into
this country,95 and the increasing presence of women in positions of author-
ity, this country is undergoing what might be termed a national identity
crisis brought on by severe cultural anxiety.96 If identity is open in Ameri-
ca and undefined by previous religious or ethnic forces, then anyone can
make a claim on that identity and old notions and definitions are inappropri-
ate. It is in the midst of this, where nothing is everything and everything is
nothing, that the Court must find its way.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE PROBLEM WITH BIFOCALS, OR, WHY THE COURT
NEEDS A NEW PRESCRIPTION
A major stumbling block for the Court is the original sin contained in
the original document. Inherent in the Court's attempts to grapple with iden-
tity is the notion of the two constitutions that has dominated our jurispru-
dence since the Constitution was written. The Court keeps wanting to cap-
ture a notion of identity that it has refused to apply consistently to our con-
stitutional litigation. The Court continues to try to create a notion of identity
for the ages that is a "pale" and limited vision of the use of identity by the
legal participants. Every attempt by someone to join the identity conversa-
tion is met with the argument that true law does not worry about the things
at our feet. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court tries to live in the great future
without dealing with its bifocalism. The Court keeps forgetting that with
bifocals, one can look far away or up close. In its desire to participate in the
document for the ages, it ignores the misery at its feet, of those trodden by
94 See MARJORIE B. GARBER, VESTED INTERESTS: CROSS-DRESSING & CULTURAL
ANXIETY (1992); MARJORIE GARBER, VICE VERSA: BISEXUALITY AND THE EROTICISM
OF EVERYDAY LIFE (1995).
95 See ARGUING IMMIGRATION: THE DEBATE OVER THE CHANGING FACE OF AMERI-
CA (Nicolaus Mills ed., 1994).
' One need only look at the headlines of newspapers to know this. For alarm cries
in popular press books, see PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT
AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION DISASTER (1995); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DIS-
UNITING OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY (1992).
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a constitutional doctrine that is incapable of understanding identity.
This explains why the Court leaves race out of its discussion of rights
and equal protection for gays and lesbians or homosexuals. 97 Because race
is not a real identity and is not constitutionally cognizable by the Court (ex-
cept to chastise those who improperly recognize and act upon it), the Court
must leave race out of its decision in Romer, even though, as we have dis-
cussed, race is immanent in the opinion. If the Court were to understand the
role of race in Romer, the rights of gays and lesbians would be lost. In
order for gays, lesbians, and bisexuals to assert their rights, they have to
lose their identity or, rather, leave their queerness in the closet, and come to
the constitutional equal protection banquet without a real identity. It seems
that the plaintiffs in the case understood this. It is important to note that
they did not seek to be recognized as a discrete and insular minority deserv-
ing equal protection's strict scrutiny. Because of this choice made by the
plaintiffs, the Court was able to formulate a constitutional response that left
out their identity but that also enabled it to see the absurdity of the identity
attributed to them by the defendants. Gays, lesbians, and bisexuals are really
without identity and therefore can be included in this equal protection dis-
course. In Romer, the Court was able to see the reality of the claims used to
defend this effort to extend oppression against gays, lesbians, and bisexuals
for what it was, but in doing so the Court still tried to deny the reality of
our racial past. Also, in deciding the case in this manner, the Court con-
tinues its romance with the perpetrator model for invidious discrimination
identified by Alan Freeman:
In its core concept of the "violation," antidiscrimination law
is hopelessly embedded in the perpetrator perspective. Its
central tenet, the "antidiscrimination principle," is the prohi-
bition of race-dependent decisions that disadvantage mem-
bers of minority groups, and its principal task has been to
select from the maze of human behaviors those particular
practices that violate the principle, outlaw the identified
practices, and neutralize their specific effects.
Antidiscrimination law has thus been ultimately indifferent to
the condition of the victim; its demands are satisfied if it can
be said that the "violation" has been remedied.98
9' The Court is inconsistent in its treatment of the issues in Romer. It adopts both
parties' stances. The Court alternatively called the plaintiffs "gays" and "lesbians" while
also describing the defendants' attribution to the plaintiffs of a content-laden program.
See Romer, 116 S. Ct. passim.
" Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination
Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1053-54
(1978).
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We see that if we operate within the perpetrator perspective, the identity of
the victim in some ways becomes peripheral to the constitutional logic of
antidiscrimination law. It does not really matter that the victims in this case
were gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. This is why the case can be described as
the most progressive case involving gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, and yet
not have much to do with gay/lesbian/bisexual rights as such.
As part of ignoring (or erasing) the identity of the victim, the Court in
Romer said:
Amendment 2 confounds this normal process of judicial
review. It is at once too narrow and too broad. It identifies
persons by a single trait and then denies them protection
across the board. The resulting disqualification of a class of
persons from the right to seek specific protection from the
law is unprecedented in our jurisprudence."
The notion that this kind of disqualification is not known to our jurispru-
dence and is unprecedented is wrong if the racial nature of the special rights
and identity claims are recognized. Before the Civil War, but as a prelude to
the debates that led to the battles that led to the Civil War, there was a very
large and significant debate about whether Congress was required to accept
petitions from women and "free" blacks that requested that Congress elimi-
nate slavery from the District of Columbia.1" The acrimony that led to the
Civil War was clearly present in the debate about these petitions. The issue
was whether the South and their Northern associates had to listen to the
arguments and debate the issue of slavery in the District. The claim of the
white Southerners was that it was an insult to them and their sacred honor
to have to listen to such debates, that they would not take the petitions, and
that the House was required to refuse to accept them. These arguments were
outside the possible and were a threat to the lives and the honor of every
white woman in the South.
Today, the argument about the rights of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals is
outside the possible and constitutes a threat to every Man, Woman, Child,
and the Family that is America. The Romer Court could not see that the
argument about the rights of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals is exactly like the
argument about slavery that the country had before the Civil War and con-
tinues to have today. Romer is about race precisely because it is about our
inability to speak the unspeakable, whether it is sodomy, gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals, or racial minorities. If we cannot see this, we and the Court are
likely to create another one hundred years of nonsensical jurisprudence.
Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (emphasis added).
100 See generally MILLER, supra note 22.
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Everywhere the Romer Court looked, it saw race and was perfectly (col-
or)blind. We think that America deserves a new prescription.

